Productivity of Culture

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"European Identity and the Cultural Dimension of Europe's External Relations" by Guy Féaux de la Croix

Some further reflections on the productivity of cultural diplomacy, on its perspectives in the external relations of the European Union, and on the political imperative of European identity.

Key word: cultural diplomacy

In the history of humankind tribes and nations have fought their wars over territory, economic opportunities, dynastic egotisms. It should, however, not be overlooked that in their origins many violent conflicts had a cultural dimension: From our human beginnings culture has been the agent of the individual’s collective identity, a means of identification. Culture being the linkage between the individual and society without which only an hermit can survive, even though not very comfortably, is of existential importance.

In extremis culture may be a question of war and peace, for example when people feel threatened in their religious faith. And yet, as compared to the enormous effort which states invest in expensive military deterrence the possibilities to defuse conflicts by addressing their cultural roots are grossly neglected.

The cultural dimension in international relations does, however, not only come to bear in the ultimate question of war and peace: In more peaceful times it serves as an agent sometimes favouring, sometimes forming obstacles to the development of fruitful relations. The standing of a nation in the international society is importantly determined by its international cultural profile. Some states engage in spectacular festivities like Olympic Games or the football world championships. Others entertain networks for a world wide cultural presence. And others yet show little ambition to project themselves in the international arena as cultural players at all.

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Writers, artists and other producers of culture do not like to think of the political or economic implications of their productions. They tend to resent their works being subjected to the measure of political productivity or commercial utility. The productivity of culture in their respective fields, however, is precisely what politicians, diplomats, and industrial sponsors will be interested in.

Take language capabilities for an example: English being a lingua franca of international trade relations, countries like Germany and France depend, in their foreign trade and investment, very much on people abroad which, as partners or employees, are familiar with their language and culture. Much of their trade and investment would simply not happen were they not stimulated and supported by an intercultural network, from schools through academic exchanges to concerts, lectures and exhibitions organised by the cultural institutes.

We have come to see, from three different angles, the importance of the cultural dimension in international relations: As a question of war and peace, as an obstacle or promoter of peaceful political co-operation, and as a catalyst for profitable trade and investment relations. Measured in terms of its factual or potential productivity culture is, however, regularly underrated as an instrument of diplomacy. On the stock markets analysts would point to an under-capitalisation, of an insufficiently exploited growth potential.

There is no standard model for a cultural diplomacy. The institutional arrangements of the cultural institutes of Britain, France, Italy, Spain and Germany, these five being the major players of cultural diplomacy in Europe, are similar and yet they clearly have their own specificities. This applies for example for the degree of their dependence, respectively autonomy, vis-à-vis their governments and embassies. Some cultural institutes are run as de facto sections of their embassy, coming under the full control of the ambassador, others are decidedly sovereign in their relations to “their”  diplomatic mission, the latter often appearing to be no more than a service-station for the former.

A reflection on which model is the most successful, i.e. in terms of the cost and effects ratio, can hardly go beyond very personal impressions. A comparative evaluation, as tempting and useful it would appear to be, would require a body of research on cultural diplomacy which practically does not exist.

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At the outset of this paper we have pointed to “cultural identification” as a key word of forming tribes and nations, and as a prerequisite for collective action, be it in the group, be it in the group’s relationships with other collectives. These were precisely the stakes of the European constitutional project, namely to at last create a framework permitting the individual European citizen to identify the European Union as a “collective body” to which he or she relates as being his or her society.

The draft EU constitution offered the golden stars flag and Beethoven’s hymn as both catalysts and expressions of identification. The lesson learnt from the failure of the constitution is that there is, at this stage, no sufficient agreement on a collective European identity. More precisely one should state that, while there was a clear majority ready to take a decisive step into the direction of an EU identity, a minority, a rather small minority in fact, of governments were able, backed by the prevailing rules of the Union, to block such a decision.

If culture has not really been at the heart of the draft constitutional treaty, it did nevertheless contain a number of references to culture which are worth mentioning all the more as they will presumably in their substance be carried over into the reform treaty:

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In a critical assessment of the text one might regret the near overwhelming reference to the diversity of European culture and the primordial focus on the inheritance. It is a rather conservative approach and also one which neglects the commonality in our cultural heritage and in our present day cultural life, there included the commonality of basic values.

The text neglects the European experience that, notwithstanding the multiplicity of national cultures, these have regularly been variations of a European cultural mainstream, from classical antiquity through the Middle ages, Renaissance & Enlightenment, nationalism & romanticism, the modernisms of the 20th century, the ever renewed process of creating contemporary art.

European integration in itself has brought forth, from a rather basic and fragmentary set of democratic and humanistic principles, a very solid body of values and of their legal protection. The cultural commonality of the European Union therefore lies not only in the common denominator of Member States’ national cultures, but in a very substantial acquis of good governance, democracy, human and civil rights, and of the rule of law. Within the large hall of  European culture there is, by now, a strong pillar of specific European Union culture. And it is this pillar on which the EU’s role and status in the world will rely.

One would therefore wish that the future practice of EU culture programmes, be it within the EU, be it in the Union’s external relations, the cultural commonality would be given greater attention than this has been the case in the draft treaty. But otherwise, even a sceptic should in fairness admit that the text is rather revolutionary, going well beyond the present day practice of EU cultural programmes. In its systematic position in chapter 8 on policy areas of the EU, culture is acknowledged on par with public health, industry, tourism, education & sport, disaster protection.

As to the substance of the competences attributed to the EU in the draft treaty they go well beyond what we would find on culture in most Member States’ national constitutions. The text grants culture an all pervasive status much in the way such cross-sectoral importance is granted to human rights, the protection of the environment and social justice.

The text goes well beyond national constitutions particularly in the field which we said would be our main focus today, id est a competence for the European Union for developing cultural external relations. Again the text here is carried by a rather restrictive tonality, once more paying the obligatory tribute to the diversity of culture where one might have wished for an EU mandate to present, in its external relations, the common culture and values of the European peoples. And still, there is a nail in the wall on which a cultural dimension of the EU’s external relations might now be built.

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A look at present realities is rather soberising: Firstly in that the financial forecast, as is called the midterm budget programme of the EU, the means made available for culture represent a not a percentage, but some very meagre promille of the total budget. In terms of structures, the European Union delegations around the world, or more precisely the permanent representations of the European Commission, a cultural mandate is rather “conspicuous by absence”. There are, hitherto, no cultural attachés in the EU Commission’s delegations, at best public relations officers who, without wishing to do them personal injustice, have not embraced culture as a domain for their activities.

European cultural action abroad, id est in non-EU countries, has traditionally been left to be looked after by the Members States, namely to the co-operation of the EU Member States’ embassies and in practice to their cultural counsellors.

Thus the fate of European culture abroad was regularly left to the ambitions of the embassy representing the EU presidency, with some showing a real interest and effort, others showing a rather non-chalant lack of interest in EU common cultural activities. EU Member States’ embassies wishing to raise the cultural profile of the EU in third countries, have often seen their ambitions curtailed by the objections of other EU Member States’ missions putting a cultural mandate of the EU into question and in any case refusing to co-operate.

Against this background, the EU’s cultural action abroad has traditionally remained limited to rather low-level co-operative projects of the EU Member States’ embassies, for example film festivals, to which each mission would contribute a film production subtitled in the local language. EU Presidency embassies often hurt themselves in painful efforts to obtain, from their diplomatic colleagues, financial contributions in the order of magnitude of a thousand Euros.

Unsurprisingly, the results were often rather mediocre and not really helpful for the image of a strong European Union and its cultural profile. An unbiased look at the pitiful state of the EU’s cultural presence abroad would seem to be a first step in fostering an awareness, in the EU institutions, of the need for a fundamentally different and more dynamic approach.

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A substantial legal basis, provided the reform treaty leaves the aforementioned clauses substantially unscathed, will be there. Therefore the future of culture in Europe and especially a cultural dimension of the EU’s external relations will now depend on the political will of those in charge. In order to translate the general desire to see culture strengthened in the Union’s profile, a desire shared by so many in the cultural field, I shall for a moment image we had convened here today with an intention of formulating a political appeal to be addressed to the EU authorities and in particular to the European Parliament. I would propose to strongly urge the EU institutions,

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We have considered, at the beginning of this paper, how much the fate of collectives hinges on identity and identification. We would not find many Europeans who would profess to having substituted, in their identity, their subjective nationality by an attachment to Europe. In a 1999 Eurobarometer survey, conducted in the then 15 EU Member States, only 4% felt European without a similar attachment to their own country, whereas 45% identified with their nation exclusively without any bondage with Europe. But remarkably altogether 52% felt that they were attached to both their own country and to Europe. An even greater majority subscribes to a European cultural identity: (recent data).

In the opinion surveys differentiated by country it is regularly the United Kingdom where people feel the least European, followed by the Scandinavians. In affirming their European identity, the Greeks are usually second only to the people in Luxemburg (recent data). Not wishing to bore the kind reader we may summarise our impression in stating that a much larger body of Europeans harbour feelings of European identity and especially of European cultural identity than the prevailing negative image in the media might suggest. In the hearts of the European peoples the European cause seems not to be lost at all.

In looking at these data, it is our political assumption that the evolution of a European identity is something desirable and that great efforts should be made to support a further evolution in that direction. This is, however, obviously a pro-European position which genuine Euro-sceptics would not subscribe to.  As we can not justify our case as being a categorical imperative, we shall have to give reasons for our position of deeming a European identity a political necessity and objective of such high importance.

The finality of European integration has, in its 5 decades, undergone fundamental changes. Only the older generations of  Europeans will remember, from their own life experience, that the European Communities were established in the 1950’s on the grounds of a general conviction that they represented the best chance yet to durably overcome the horror of war which had inflicted so much destruction and suffering on the continent in the first half of the 20th century.

In the course of the years the EC proved to be a solid foundation on which to stand our ground against the communist menace, to liberate countries from dictatorships and guide them onto a path of democracy and the rule of law, and finally, in the 2006 enlargement round, to stabilise the young Eastern European democracies which had emerged from the collapse of the Soviet empire.

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It results from the accomplishment of these finalities, its “missions accomplished” situation, that Europe has fallen into a crisis of finality, taking with it the political imperative of a European identity, all resulting in calls for a broad debate on the raisons d’être and the geographical definition of Europe. Significantly, the Europeans were thrown into a void of finality precisely at a moment when their political leaders felt that the time had come for the Union to adopt a constitution which in turn would have supported the emergence of a European identity.

The conjunction of the constitutional failure with a crisis of finality and identity makes it quite clear that the idea of a European identity is a voluntaristic one. We would surely not devote so many thoughts, doubts and efforts on the subject of a European identity were it not that we need of it for political reasons. From the constitutional episode we may retain, for the future history of the European Union, that it had come very close to a voluntaristic, political act of constituting a European identity, with the endorsement of a large majority of states and a respectable backing in popular attitudes, had the operation not been jeopardised by tactical blunders of insensitive actors on the European stage and in two Member States.

Now, speaking in the autumn of 2007, a number of elements suggest that the European ebb-tide experienced in the constitutional crisis may have turned. Surely constitutional ambitions have been shelved for an unforeseeable future. But at the same time European leaders have closed their ranks, with one rather bizarre temporary exception, to save the governmental substance of the draft, which is those reforms which are deemed indispensable to keep the Union governable.

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The first half of the year 2007 may well be seen, by future historiographers, as a turning point. In that period of the German EU presidency the constitutional, finality and identity crisis of the Union converged with global challenges of an unprecedented dimension. The European peoples were profoundly impressed by the dramatic effects of climate change, making itself felt in the every day lives of many citizens, and no less by the experience of vulnerability of Europe’s energy supplies.

While the so called reflection period the European Union had granted itself after the debacle of the French and Dutch referenda, had not really brought forth much inspiration for fresh philosophy, the answers to Europe’s identity crisis seemed to be given by the force of facts, the challenges of globalisation. It became clearer than ever before that a good future of the European peoples relies above all on the capacity of the European Union to take decisions and to act decisively in the international arena.

It must surely be a profound cultural experience of the European peoples, that on the international level the European Union stands for a set of values which distinguishes it from most other actors of world politics: a commitment to human rights there included the rejection of the death penalty, an attitude of responsibility in the face of the climate and resources crisis, the volatility of relations with Russia, the rising power of states like China and India, a  protracted estrangement from the USA. It is the fundamental experience of a common specificity, of being collectively different from others which is at this stage is giving the emergence of a European identity a new and strong impetus.

In a globalised world of existential threats the Europeans are undergoing the experience that in tackling these problems they will have to rely first and above all on themselves, that they are specific in their culture, and even a growing awareness is making itself felt of a global responsibility. It is an awareness that prospects for the survival of humankind on our planet are even gloomier than they are in any case, if Europe does not set an example for a responsible attitude towards our planetary inheritance, if we do not invest great efforts in convincing the world community of a universal responsibility and of the need to act together.

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If we translate these observations, for a moment, into the life of an individual we would come to see a person with a very strong identity pattern: We would see before us an individual rich in cultural experience, very specific in his attitudes and values, aware of his or her responsibilities in society, motivated by a consciousness that the fate of the group will determine his or her own chances for survival.

The identity of individuals as of collectives is often understood to be the result of anthropological evolution, history, roots, family traditions. Especially here in Athens, the birthplace of European philosophy, we should recognise the voluntaristic dimension of identity: Even though not entirely without limitations, we may strive to be who we wish to be, and we should wish to be who we need to be. We would be mistaken to understand our identity as a static body into which we are born for good or for bad.

Is not this the quintessential of all philosophy, that our reason enables us not only to better understand (even though never completely) who we are, but also who we ought to be. Obviously the identity of who we ought to be may be quite different from who we are. We are not victims of who we have come to be, but we have been granted a considerable margin of freedom to become who we want to be. For believing Christians this is a very elementary lesson which Jesus Christ has taught us. And it is only reasonable to accept and adopt to the best of our abilities the “existential identity” which will in the best possible way leave us a chance for surviving on this planet and to do so in human dignity.

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Identities cannot be manufactured out the blue, not an individual’s identity, nor a collective identity. The pain staking efforts which the international community has in recent years invested in “nation building”, be it in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan or Iraq, and the results have made it quite plain that the strongest political will may not create a national identity if there is no objective foundation for it, nor a subjective disposition towards it in the hearts of the people. Collective identity needs both, a sufficiently solid commonality in historical and cultural traditions, and the will to be a group, or tribe, or a nation.

In the case of Europe, it would be difficult to deny a common body of history and culture to which all Member States relate in one way or another. We have earlier on pointed out that the peoples of Europe, i.e. a solid overall majority, are aware of their cultural identity. The preconditions are there for developing a European identity, a general awareness of the Europeans that their futures will be determined by the European Union, that it is their Union and, in addition to their nations, their political framework. As for the political willingness one might well say that work is in progress, even though the progression towards a European identity often shows a rhythm of leaping a step back on every two steps taken forward.

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Let us then conclude, from these reflections, that a European identity is an imperative of the global challenges. On the solid foundation of a long and commonly experienced history, we should seek to define our identity, the contents of it, also in the light of these challenges. It is this a teleological view of identity which should guide us not only to give inner substance to it but also to consider the question of enlargement in the light of necessity.

The reform treaty will not be the inspiration of an European identity which it authors had intended. But it will, if the promises are kept, hopefully give culture a greater role in the further evolution of the Union, and it will help the question of identity to mature. This is the political productivity of culture in building up the European Union.

Culture will only fully unfold its potential productivity for the good of European cohesion if greater emphasis is placed on the commonality of the European experience. In its relations with the world, the European Union will not fully be accepted as a partner unless its political and economic strategies are supported by an exchange and a dialogue of cultures. The future foreign service of the European Union should therefore, from the beginning, include a strong cultural dimension.

For all this we need not wait for tomorrow. We should start today, to readjust our visions, to better understand the role culture can play in Europe and in our relations with the world, and to fully bring to bear in Europe the productivity of culture.

 

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